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I would like to introduce the presentation of this activity 
at Langley by presenting an outline which you can use as a road 
map of the work that you are going to hear about for the rest of 
the day. Our program objective is identified in figure 1. We 
have said it several times already, but basically it is to quantify 
the national risks associated with accidental release of carbon 
fibers (CF) from civil aircraft having composite structures. 
Because of the sparsity of CF on current civil aircraft, we are 
looking ahead 15 years. As a part of determining the national 
risk, we will be looking for potential equipment damage on civil 
aircraft and, therefore, we will assess the need, if any, to pro- 
tect civil aircraft from accidentally released carbon fiber. 
CARBON FIBER HAZARD RISK ASSESSMENT 
PROGRAM OBJECTIVES 
a QUANTIFY RISK ASSOCIATED WITH ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF CARBON FIBERS FROM 
CIVIL AIRCRAFT HAVING COMPOSITE STRUCTURES 
I ASSESS THE NEED FOR PROTECTION OF CIVIL AIRCRAFT TO ACCIDENTALLY RELEASED 
CARBON FIBER 
Figure 1 
What requirements do we have on a risk assessment? 
First, as shown in figure 2, we must develop an accident 
scenario and associated probabilities. This involves integrating 
both known data and judgements from experts in a logical 
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framework. We must explicitly state the assumptions and the 
source of the data so that we can assess the conservatism of 
the data inputs and of the judgements. Second, we must 
estimate public risk in a very systematic manner. Once an 
estimate is made, we can then determine the significance of 
any assumptions by sensitivity analysis, and we can quantify the 
uncertainty in the risks through evaluation of our assumptions, 
data, inaccuracies in the data, and the technical judgements 
that have gone into the analysis. This systematic framework 
also allows us the opportunity of evaluating risk reduction 
strategies. We have already mentioned one such strategy, 
the alternate materials program, which is a strategy to 
develop alternates to current graphite epoxy composites 
where the mechanism of release of graphite fibers from the 
composite is modified or the airborne characteristics of 
the fibers are changed in a favorable way. Other strategies 
such as protection of a substantial portion of the electrical 
equipment in the U.S. might be offered (as a ridiculous 
option) but some acceptable option could be developed. 
The final requirement on our risk assessment is that we 
perform the analysis in such a manner that we can make 
comparisons of the benefit of carbon fiber with the risk and 
that we can assess the risk against other risks of which we 
are familiar in other areas. 
RISK ANALYSIS 
DEVELOPS ACCIDENT SCENARIOS AND ASSOCIATED PROBABILITIES 
INTEGRATES KNOWN DATA AND JUDGEMENT FROM EXPERTS IN A LOGICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
EXPLICITLY STATES ASSUMPTIONS 
ESTIMATES PUBLIC RISK IN A SYSTEMATIC MANNER 
DETERMINES SIGNIFICANCE OF ASSUMPTIONS BY SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
QUANTIFIES UNCERTAINTY 
PERMITS EVALUATION OF RISK REDUCTION STRATEGIES 
PERMITS COMPARISON WITH BENEFITS AND OTHER RISKS 
Figure 2 
Let us look now at the scenario that we have adopted as 
of interest for the accidental release of carbon fiber from 
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civil aircraft. Figure 3 illustrates the scenario that we see 
is important for the air transport aircraft. We are hypoth- 
esizing accidents of civil aircraft, usually near major 
airports, where the efflux from the burn of an aircraft 
containing composite has an opportunity to be distributed 
downwind and to contaminate the airport terminal facilities and 
air traffic control and ground control approach systems. 
This efflux has an opportunity of being carried into shopping 
centers, banks, local businesses, and into the homes of 
private individuals, where household appliances could be 
affected by the released graphite fibers. We have to be 
concerned with public service areas, such as telephone 
exchanges and hospitals, as well as manufacturing and transportation 
facilities. Of course, one item ties all of these together. 
This network is the power distribution system of the various 
utility systems. 
RISK ANALYSIS SCENARIOS 
Figure 3 
Another dimension of the risk analysis is illustrated 
by the risk analysis flow chart shown in figure 4. Six 
elements are associated with the physical phenomena of the 
accidental release. I will go through this in a little more 
detail, step by step, and since this conference is organized 
along the lines of this chart, I will only mention that 
basically I am referring to the source of carbon fiber, the 
potential dissemination of carbon fiber, the life of the 
released fiber (which may result in a potential redissemination 
that might cause a problem at a later time), the transfer of 
17 
I III lllllllllllllllllllll II Ill1 I lllllll I II II II III I 
CF from the exterior of enclosures to the interior, and the 
vulnerability of equipment associated with the various areas 
of importance identified in the risk analysis scenario. In 
the final step, we must relate the demographic data with the 
density of equipment in homes and businesses to determine 
cost impacts. 
RISK ANALYSIS FLOW 
TRANSFER FUNCTION 
- COST RISK 
Figure 4 
Looking at the element of source, figure 5, this first 
area covers the release of carbon fibers. Within the context 
of a risk assessment, we must determine the quantity of 
released fibers and their character. In order to determine 
the quantity of released carbon fibers, we must first project 
the use of carbon composites in the future. You have seen 
some projections earlier. We must then estimate the most 
likely locations and magnitude of accidents as well as the 
type of accident. It is important, in determining the 
release of graphite fiber, to know whether the accident was 
a crash burn, or a burn explode, or a total demolition at 
contact. We have National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
data on accidents, but we are currently investigating, in depth, 
the details of all U.S. built jet transport accidents on which 
t-o base a better analysis. Fiber release is influenced by a 
number of factors: fire size and temperatures, the length of the 
fire, the nature and the character of composite material, and 
where it is used in the aircraft. Finally, the character of the 
released fibers must be determined. The character of the fibers 
includes the mass of fiber released, the form (single fibers, 
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clumps, clusters, and strips), and the length and diameters 
of single fibers. 
Figure 5 
Given that fibers are released as single fibers or in 
other forms, the fibers will be carried off by the fire 
plume, as shown in figure 6. They will be carried up and 
away from the location of the fire or, if by an explosion, 
projected away from the source of the fire and then dispersed 
downwind from the accident scene. This dispersion can be 
characterized in several ways; one way is by looking at 
footprints of concentration of fibers, or by exposure. Some 
of the key elements involved in the dispersion estimates 
include the fire plume development, which depends upon the 
weather, the amount of fuel burned, and the rate of burn. 
The items that affect the dispersion of the cloud of fibers 
downwind from the fully developed fire plume include the 
weather and the fall rate or settling rate of the released 
fiber. 
The footprints are presented in terms of exposure, as 
defined in figure 7, since exposure has been found to be the 
key parameter in the probability of failure of electrical 
equipment. 
One element that must be included in our final risk 
assessment and has not been included to date is the long 
term effects of re.leased fibers, which conceivably could be 
redisseminated by winds or through mechanical agitation. 
Let me say simply that in addition to the potential for 
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DEFINITIONS 
NUMBER OF FIBERS 
METER3 
NUMBER OF FIBERS x SECONDS 
METER3 
E = 
I 
Cdt 
PROBABILITY OF DAMAGE = 1 - e-E'E 
TRANSFER FUNCTION, RATIO OF QUANTITIES 
ACROSS AN INTERFACE, FOR EXAMPLE: 
E INSIDE’E OUTSIDE 
Figure 7 
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redissemination, we would expect that the character of 
released fiber might change with time. Figure 8 
shows an hypothesis about the change in character of the 
length spectrum with time. A later speaker will discuss this 
in more detail. 
“FIBER LIFE” 
& 
REDlSSEMlNATlON 
LENGTH LENGTH 
Figure 8 
Eventually, the released carbon fiber will reach homes, 
businesses, and factories, and we must estimate what interior 
fiber concentration or exposure will result. Figure 9 
illustrates the expected effect, though a number of factors 
influence the actual values of what we call transfer function. 
Some of the factors that affect the transfer function include 
the use or nonuse of air-conditioning, the condition of 
windows (opened or closed) in buildings, natural ventilation, 
the fall rate of fibers, and generally the nature of air 
circulation and what kind of filtration, if any, is used in 
buildings. 
Once fiber concentrations are carried to electrical 
equipment, the electrical conductivity of the fiber can 
result in a hazard to susceptible equipment. The probability 
of failure for a couple of assumed examples is illustrated 
in figure 10 and has been experimentally determined to 
follow the exponential relationship cited on the definition 
chart (figure 7). 
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For the risk assessment, we must categorize susceptible 
equipment into classes and categories appropriate for investigation 
in risk models. This means that we must determine the 
susceptibility and vulnerability of a wide range of equipment 
in the very diverse areas covering household, business, and 
industrial electrical equipment. Let me point out that the 
values shown here are simply selected for illustration and 
the subsequent speaker will show some data on a range of 
civilian equipment that might be involved in a carbon fiber 
problem. Let me also point out that this is plotted in a 
little different form from that you sometimes see; that is, 
the probability of failure is represented on a log plot, 
which gives you an S-shaped curve in contrast to the ex- 
ponential form on a linear plot that most researchers in 
this area utilize. 
Finally, we must combine the physical models with our 
demographic model in such a way as to obtain a suitable 
measure of risk. One such measure is the risk profile 
illustrated in figure 11 which gives the annual probability 
of exceeding a given dollar damage as a function of the 
dollar damage. Since you are going to see a few of these 
over the next couple of days, I thought it might be appropriate 
to give you a simple example. Basically, at a point on the 
abscissa representing, for example, a million dollars, or 
whatever number you want to choose, the ordinate gives the 
probability of exceeding the million dollars in a given 
year. This representation might be unfamiliar to some who 
have not studied risk analysis in the past but it has been 
used as a typical measure in analyses that have been done in 
the areas of nuclear power and liquid natural gas transportation. 
Let me now outline our approach to the risk analysis 
program. (See figure 12.) A central portion Of our effort is 
to develop an adequate data base for a credible analysis. 
In many areas, before we can actually generate data, we must 
perform what we call pathfinder studies to determine what 
data should be obtained. These pathfinder studies, for 
example, involve looking at specific types of electrical 
equipment, determining in what manner they might be exposed 
to carbon fibers, and determining what kind of test is 
needed. We have the capability to assess the vulnerability of 
electrical equipment by exposing the equipment in a fiber 
chamber but in some cases we have found that other methods 
can be used. They will be discussed in a later presentation. 
When you first study a new area, you must quantify the new 
area. We have found that it is necessary to go out and 
physically survey hospitals, telephone exchanges, and factories 
in order to determine in what area we need to make measurements. 
The data and pathfinder studies are being used in our analysis 
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Figure 11 
PROGRAM OUTLINE 
ASSESSMENT OF RISK ASSOCIATED WITH ACCIDENTAL RELEASE 
OF CARBON FIBERS FROM CIVIL AIRCRAFT 
CY 78 
I 
1 EXPECTED RESULTS 
RISK ESTIMATES 
VERIFICATION OF 
PHYSICAL MODEL 
ASSESSlNG OF RISK 
Figure 12 
24 
effort to determine the risk to the United States as a 
whole. Our first phase analysis effort has primarily been 
one to develop an adequate methodology in which we have 
confidence, and to make an interim risk estimate. This 
activity of our risk analysis has resulted in two studies 
that you will hear reported on tomorrow. We anticipate 
continuing these first phase studies through most of the 
rest of the calendar year. Our second phase efforts will 
include evaluating studies that we have currently underway 
and data that are expected to be generated in the near future. 
Our plans in each area will be covered by subsequent speakers. 
We will also be using data being developed by other government 
agencies, such as the studies of the Department of Energy in 
the power distribution area. Finally we anticipate performing 
some tests to allow us an opportunity for verification of 
the physical model used in the risk analysis. We are, at this 
time, in the initial development of what could be described 
as a contained end-to-end test which will be discussed by 
the last speaker of the day. We are also assessing the need 
for a full scale outdoor end-to-end test. One final item, 
our program allows for us to evaluate the material characteristics 
that are coming out of the alternate materials programs that 
Dr. Harris described in the second presentation of this 
conference. If necessary, we can assess the reduction in 
risk that might be associated with any particular alternate 
material. 
We have a number of participants on the risk assessment 
program, as shown on figure 13. Without going into detail, 
I would like to just check off the list and try to indicate 
where the work is going on. The Fire Products Division of 
AVCO, in Massachusetts, is working with us on developing chamber 
test methods for fire testing materials to determine the 
characteristics of released graphite fibers. The Ballistic 
Research Laboratory (BRL), at Aberdeen, Maryland, has been 
working with us on vulnerability testing of equipment and on 
transfer function measurements. We have been quite heavily 
dependent upon that activity in the past for much of our 
data. The Bionetics Corporation, Hampton, Virginia, has 
been performing pathfinder studies and analysis that has led 
us to identify many areas in which additional data are needed. 
They have also identified areas where we can short cut some 
of the laborious paths that we have had to follow to analyze 
the risk. The commercial aircraft manufacturers, Boeing, 
Douglas, and Lockheed, have been assisting us by supplying 
information on potential uses of carbon composites in the 
future and in details of aircraft accidents. They are studying 
the airplane accidents of all jet airplanes that they have 
built. They have detailed data on these accidents in their 
files and are correlating that data with NTSB accident data 
so that we can have a better understanding of how much of an 
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GRAPHITE FIBERS RISK ANALYSIS 
PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS 
AVCO SOURCE 
BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORY - VULNERABILITY, TRANSFER FUNCTION 
ABERDEEN 
BIONETICS CORPORATION - PATHFINDER STUDIES 
BOEING 
DOUGLAS 
1 
- SOURCE, AIRCRAFT VULNERABILITY 
LOCKHEED 
DAHLG;EiiEjAVAL SURFACE WEAPONS - SOURCE, END-TO-END TESTS 
DUGWAY PROVING GROUND - DISSEMINATION, FIBER LIFE - REDISSEMINATION 
JET PROPULSION LABORATORY - INSTRUMENTATION 
A. D. LITTLE 
OR1 - ANALYSIS 
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS - VULNERABILITY 
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS, INC. - DISSEMINATION 
TRW - DATA ANALYSIS 
Figure 13 
aircraft actually burns. We need to know what the opportunity is 
for a wing tip or an elevator to be involved in an actual fire. 
In addition, as part of the risk analysis activity and as a part 
of assessing the need for protection to civil aircraft, they are 
studying the susceptibility of electrical equipment in their cur- 
rent and future air transport aircraft to determine how vulnerable 
aircraft are and what protection may be needed. In the source 
area, the Dahlgren Naval Surface Weapons Center in Virginia has 
been testing a number of material specimens, as well as aircraft 
components, to determine released fiber characteristics. They are 
also participating in our end-to-end test activity that you will 
hear about this afternoon. The Dugway Proving Ground in Utah has 
been assisting us in calculations of dissemination and in predic- 
tion of the life and redissemination of fibers. The later data 
have been obtained from measurements at a site where fibers were 
released outdoors several years ago. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
has been looking at some innovative ideas for released fiber sensin 
instrumentation. We have a considerable problem with instrumenta- 
tion. Dick Heldenfels mentioned earlier' that you can look right 
at fibers and not see them. When fibers are in concentrations 
high enough that you can see them, such as you may have in a 
fiber chamber, you can hardly count them, and we actually have to 
count the fibers to determine the number of fibers released. The 
techniques to date have been primarily through manual counting. WC 
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are trying to develop some instrumentation that will allow us to 
do this a little faster. I should point out that Dugway Proving 
Ground has been instrumental in providing this type of counting. 
We have A. D. Little of Massachusetts, OR1 of Maryland, and George 
Washington University assisting us in analysis. The National 
Bureau of Standards is assisting us in a study of household appli- 
ances. Many household appliances can be tested by a simpler 
method than a carbon fiber chamber. The National Bureau of Standards 
has been tasked in the national carbon fiber program, with responsi- 
bility for evaluating household equipment, and is assisting NASA by 
determining vulnerability. Science Applications Inc., of California, 
under contract to the Ames Research Center, is supporting our pro- 
gram by providing fire dynamics and plume models. Finally, TRW Inc. 
of California has been analyzing data for us from the large scale 
burn tests they performed for the Air Force at the Navy's China 
Lake, California, facility. I should note that we are using data 
generated by other programs, such as the alternate materials pro- 
gram. The Ames Research Center has some burn facilities at their 
installation and has been supplying us with data from these facil- 
ities. In addition, we will take advantage of data generated by 
other agency efforts in the federal program such as the Department 
of Energy's activity on carbon fiber effects on power system 
elements. 
The agenda for the remaining presentations in the conference 
is presented in figure 14. 
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